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With Germany having finally overcome its long eco-
nomic stagnation in 2006, its public finance has also
become much more favourable, showing a fiscal sur-
plus in 2007 for the first time since German reunifica-
tion.Additionally,the debt ratio was reduced to 65 per-
cent after having reached almost 68 percent in 2005.
Nevertheless, neither the Federation (Bund) nor a
large number of Länder (states) had managed to com-
ply with the respective – and quite generous – limits of
net borrowing laid down in the constitutions in the
years before. The deficit had been in excess of the
3 percent deficit ceiling of the European Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) from 2002 for four years in a row.
Annual interest payments have reached around 15 per-
cent of the expenditures of the federal budget in recent
years. Having such a high public indebtedness narrows
the scope for manoeuvre of fiscal policy and poses a
heavy burden to future generations, especially under
the conditions of an ageing society and implicit debt.
As the current budget rule in the Federal
Constitution has not been able to prevent the accu-
mulation of debt – which increasingly confines the
government’s capacity to act – the political discussion
has recently focused on the introduction of a new
budget rule. The first “practical” task started in the
Federal Ministry of Finance in late spring 2006. This
work has led to a central goal of the “Stage 2” of the
Federalism Reform in Germany, carried out by the
Committee on the Modernisation of the Financial
Relations between the Federation and the states.The
central goal is to enact a more effective budget rule
than the current one.Since then the Federal Ministry
of Finance has been involved in the conceptual task
aimed at developing a new budget rule, and present-
ed – in the name of the federal government – a pro-
posal for a new budget rule to the aforementioned
Committee at the end of February 2008 (Kommission
zur Modernisierung der Bund-Länder Finanzbe-
ziehungen 2008). The proposal has been approved
and its economic and political aspects have been test-
ed against the competing models such as the net-
investment model of the Council of Economic
Experts (CEE). At present, there is a lively discus-
sion both inside the parties of the Grand Coalition
and in the states, since a new budget rule enjoys –
besides the development of an early warning system
in order to prevent a budgetary crisis – the highest
priority on the agenda of the Committee.1A draft bill
should be finalised by the end of 2008.
In this article we will firstly deal with the status quo
of the existing budget rule and the resulting prob-
lems. In the next section the two main concepts of
how a new budget rule can be designed are dis-
cussed, followed by our own proposal for a reform.
The final section concludes.
Status quo and problems of the existing budget rule
The current budget rule was implemented at the end
of 1960s – the heyday of Germany’s Keynesian fiscal
policy fine-tuning. According to Article 15 of the
German Constitution net borrowing in the proposed
budget is limited to the amount of (gross) public
investment. Exceptions to this rule are only allowed
in the case of an emerging “disturbance of the
macroeconomic equilibrium”. Art. 109 II of the
German Constitution has another similarly impre-
cise obligation stating that the Federation and the
states must take the macroeconomic equilibrium
into consideration when approving their budgets.
The economic and general institutional framework
has changed, however, since the implementation of
the current budget rule, which makes the rule obso-
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istics, see Groneck and Plachta (2008).lete in some aspects. Globalisation has reduced the
power of the instrument that once was seen as a
global controlling mechanism. Secular decline of
potential growth rates accompanied by demograph-
ic changes has led to conflicts in the social security
system regarding the intergenerational distribution
of financial burden. Last but not least, besides the
Federal Constitution (and the respective state con-
stitutions) the guidelines introduced by the
European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) must
now also be adhered to.
On the other hand, such changed general environ-
ments may also have contributed to the increase in
public debt at the federal level.As the constitutions
of many states have similar – in some cases even the
same – rules as the Federation does,this may also be
true on the state and municipality levels since 1970,
particularly exacerbated in the years after German
reunification when the public debt increased much
more strongly than GDP.
One of the major problems of the existing budget
rule is that it reacts asymmetrically over the business
cycle.In situations of a disturbance of the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium, net borrowing is not limited at
all. But there is no corresponding rule for the oppo-
site case: there is no obligation to reduce net bor-
rowing (or to create a surplus) if economy is in
“good” shape with a positive output gap. For
instance, in the past, public expenditures rose and
revenues decreased in bad economic years, while
there was no comparable (opposite) development
recorded in those favourable periods.
Second, the exception clause, i.e. the disturbance of
the macroeconomic equilibrium,
is not clear enough and there-
fore it has always been difficult
to decide, before applying this
rule,whether the macroeconom-
ic equilibrium is really disturbed
or not. There have been two
judgements by the Federal
Constitutional Court regarding
this matter: one in April 1989
about the budget in 1981 and the
other in July 2007 on the budget
in 2004.In 1989,for example,the
Federal Constitutional Court
did not make a precise defini-
tion of the exception but stated
that the legislator had a scope
for judgemental evaluation in
this question. The only obligation was that the
assessment of the situation had to be based on eco-
nomic data and backed by statements of the legiti-
mated, financial and economic advisory institutions
(e.g. Financial Planning Council, Business Cycle
Council, CEE and Bundesbank). In addition, the
assessment had to be traceable and justified by the
perceptions of economic theory and public econom-
ics. Ultimately, in case of a dispute, it is the Federal
Constitutional Court itself that must examine and
evaluate the question of whether the assessment of
the legislator was traceable and justifiable.
In general such an exception rule also made it rela-
tively easy to face political or economic pressure by
increasing structural debt behind the veil of “macro-
economic equilibrium” and “intergenerational bur-
den sharing”. In recent decades, for example, this
rule was repeatedly used to “finance” German unifi-
cation, without fully recognising major negative
(mid- to long-term) impacts of a growing debt on the
economy. But also at the beginning of this century,
this track has not been abandoned.
In the proposed budgets of the Federation from 2002
to 2004 and even that for 2006,net borrowing exceed-
ed the limit defined by the investment expenditures,
and this was also true for some states in recent years.
In 2002 and 2003, net borrowing of the Federation
exceeded investment expenditure only in the “sup-
plementary” budget, while the excess took place
already in the “original” budget for the year 2004. In
all cases such an excess was officially justified by a
disturbed macroeconomic equilibrium. The opposi-
tion parties at the time – CDU/CSU and FDP – rea-
soned that there was no disturbance of the macro-
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economic equilibrium,and filed an action against the
2004 budget law at the Federal Constitutional Court.
In 2005 the federal government, which did not have
to prepare a supplementary budget,protected the net
borrowing excess again in terms of a disturbed
macroeconomic equilibrium,because it still had cred-
it authorisations from former years that had not been
utilised. Finally, in 2006 the government again justi-
fied the excess in the same manner, although there
had already been some signals that the economy was
recovering. But also in the years before 2002, the
exception rule was used without having a clear-cut
knowledge about whether the macroeconomic equi-
librium was really disturbed or not. In almost half of
the investigated period since 1970, net borrowing of
the central government was higher than its gross
investment (Figure 1). Moreover, a clear correlation
between the budget rule (as a type of golden rule)
and investment could not be observed.
The marked increase in the general government’s
indebtedness from 17.5 percent relative to GDP in
1970 to 65.0 percent in 2007 could not be prevented
(Figure 2).The increase above the Maastricht refer-
ence value of 60 percent of GDP was interrupted
only by small and non-sustainable decreases in the
years around 2002.Furthermore,the rapid growth of
interest payments reduced the fiscal policy scope
dramatically.
Besides, Article 115 of the German Constitution
turned out to be incompatible with the SGP,
although the deficit was below the 3 percent criteri-
on in 2006 and therefore well in line with the rules
prescribed in the SGP. Yet net borrowing still
exceeded gross investment that year. Beyond this,
the existing budget rule accompanied by rising pub-
lic debt is not in line with the budgetary objective of
long-term sustainability.Another problem is that the
so-called “investment concept” relates to gross
investment expenditure as the limiting factor. By
neglecting depreciation of the public capital stock,
the limit for net borrowing is therefore set too high,
without any significant economic implication.
On July 9, 2007, the Federal Constitutional Court
again dismissed action against a budget violating
constitutional principles – this time for the year 2004.
The Court acknowledged that the reasons and
actions of the former federal government had been
traceable and justifiable. But the Court also stressed
that the existing budget rule was in need of reform,
without mentioning any details about what a
reformed rule should look like. In contrast to the
decision made in 1989, the Court gave neither any
further guidelines nor set any time scope required
for the reform.
As a consequence of the growing public debt and the
non-conformity with the SGP, the increased con-
sciousness about the necessary consolidation that
should (and could) not be postponed any more,as well
as the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court,a
vivid discussion started in public about a reform of the
existing budget rule.As already mentioned above, the
formulation of a new budget rule was chosen as one of
the prior goals of the Committee on the Moderni-
sation of the Financial Relations between the Fede-
ration and the states, established by the Presidents of
the  Bundestag and the Bundesrat in March 2007.
Given the economic and fiscal situation of Germany
and the current majority in Parliament, chances for a
binding decision for a reform – which requires a con-
stitutional change – together with
a fixed date of implementation
are favourable. The current eco-
nomic upswing has led to a cycli-
cal improvement of the fiscal
stance and consequently to com-
pliance with the existing budget
rules (German Constitution and
SGP). This also appears to have
led to a structural improvement
of revenues in the medium term
by substituting one-off measures
(e.g. privatisation gains) with tax
revenues. Such favourable condi-
tions additionally provide broad
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Figure 2Concepts of a new budget rule: Golden rule versus
balanced budget in the medium term
Firstly some suggest that the chance for reforming the
current budget rule could also be used to change the
target orientation from a deficit level to an expendi-
ture path (see Horn et al. 2008; Vesper 2008). Yet in
the case of such a system transfer, there would be no
enforcement mechanism that works in the direction
of sustainable public finance. More precisely, the
option with an expenditure path would not solve the
problem of increasing deficits. Since there is no any
correction mechanism for those policy measures that
are not (or insufficiently) financed by revenues, it
would not offer an adjustment mechanism to different
revenue paths in the future, and it would certainly
increase incentives to circumvent the expenditure
path via “creative” measures on the revenue side, e.g.
via tax expenditures or tax allowances.
If one keeps to the principle of a budget rule aiming
at maintaining a certain deficit level, two different
concepts basically exist. The idea of the golden rule
of fiscal policy is to limit public net borrowing to the
amount of net public investment. In contrast, the
SGP approach aims at a balanced budget which
mandates that net borrowing be (close to) zero in
the medium term but permits the so-called automat-
ic stabilisers in the short term (see below).
The idea behind the golden rule is classical and
based on the following economic assumption: pub-
lic investment is accompanied by an asset accumu-
lation which is also of use for future generations.
For this reason it is justified that the future genera-
tions also bear a share in the costs arising in the
financing. The underlying rationale is that produc-
tive public investment raises potential output per
capita in the future. While Germany follows a
“modified” type of golden rule where gross public
investment is the restraining factor, the United
Kingdom,Australia and New Zealand apply a gold-
en rule oriented to net public investment. Other
countries like Belgium, the Netherlands and
Sweden, which introduced the golden rule in the
1950s and 1960s,gave up the system in the course of
time. Another difference between Germany and,
for example, the United Kingdom is that, while the
limit of the budget has to be observed every year in
Germany,the rule in the United Kingdom has to be
followed over the medium-term financial planning
only. In order to ensure sustainable public finance,
a so-called sustainable investment rule exists in the
United Kingdom in addition to the rule stating that
the public debt ratio must be kept below 40 percent
of GDP.
Theoretically, a golden rule can be optimal for sever-
al reasons. It can be optimal (1) if – compared to a
regime where public debt is prohibited – public
investment is below the social optimum level,and (2)
if there are – in the presence of political or institu-
tional restrictions – incentives to cut productive pub-
lic investment.Another argument often used for the
golden rule is that intergenerational redistribution
should favour today’s generations and at the expense
of future generations. Without really knowing what
the social optimum level of public investment is,
Figure 1 shows a clear downward trend of gross pub-
lic investment expenditure since German reunifica-
tion despite the existence of a golden rule.One of the
reasons is that this type of public expenditure is the
easiest to cut. Even worse, the reduction of public
investment was accompanied by an increase of pub-
lic debt, punishing future generations.
The golden rule is criticised not only because of this
experience. One of the major problems associated
with such a rule is the problem of how to define
investment. In practice, it turns out to be technically
difficult to determine the precise depreciation rate.
In addition the determination could be subject to
manipulation, as there is an incentive to underesti-
mate these rates.In Germany,an additional problem
emerges because government’s investment grants
for the private sector or transfers for other countries
are also recorded as investments.In both cases,how-
ever, a (direct) net wealth increase does not take
place at the government level.Moreover,some types
of public expenditures are presently classified as
“consumptive” but have investment characteristics,
e.g. expenditures for R&D or education. A golden
rule that fails to include these kinds of expenditures
as investment would provide incentives to reduce
them to a level below the socially optimal one.
Since education in Germany is a matter of the states,
this question is not of much relevance for a budget
rule on the Federation level. But counting all educa-
tion expenditures as investment would widen the
deficit limit for the states considerably. On the level
of the Federation this would amount largely to the
non-investitve transfers of funds to the states aimed
at supporting research institutions of the so-called
Blue List (Scientific Community Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz, an association of German research insti-
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tutes of different specialisations) as well as stimulat-
ing R&D activities of private firms within the public
innovation promotion policy.
The difficulty arising with the inclusion of education
expenditure is that in order to calculate net invest-
ment correctly, one has to be able to compute the
depreciation of human capital. This is an extremely
difficult task. The research that has attempted to
tackle this problem suggests a rather high deprecia-
tion rate (see examples given in Sachverständigenrat
2007, 130). Together with the extremely low correla-
tion with the outcome resulting from educational
expenditures,2 this fact suggests that inclusion of the
education expenditure into the public investment
concept and thereby increasing the tolerable level of
net borrowing can occur only in a very restrictive
manner.These and other difficulties led the Advisory
Council to the Federal Ministry of Finance (1980) as
well as the Federal Constitutional Court in its judge-
ment about Article 115 of the German Constitution
(1989) to decide against such an inclusion.
An imminent danger – which again creates a politi-
cal incentive to spend for “good reasons” – involved
with the question of the correct definition of the
investment term is that it might open the floodgates
to a discussion of including other non-investment
public expenditures in the health sector, for child-
care or for security reasons, as they could be inter-
preted as investment in the future and preconditions
for economic growth. Another problem with the
golden rule is that – though it follows the principle of
intertemporal equivalence – it is accompanied by a
growing sustainability gap in the face of demograph-
ic changes witnessed in many industrial countries
including Germany. In this respect, a golden rule
does not adhere to sustainability principles in an
ageing society.
All these aspects that argue against a golden rule
have to be seen together with the robust result of
economic theory that holds that deficit financing of
public expenditure – no matter whether this is used
for consumption or investment – burdens future gen-
erations and leads to lower growth. This is true at
least for the plausible case in the long run when the
interest rate is greater than the secular shrinking of
the potential growth rate. Desired redistribution
effects to the detriment of future generations are
then the only justification for public expenditures
financed by the long-term debt. These effects, how-
ever, are counteracted in an ageing society by the
burden that future generations have to bear in the
face of the demographic change – especially in a
social security system that is based solely on a pay-
as-you-go principle.
Aside from the intergenerational problem, a golden
rule neglects the productivity of private investment
as a substitute to public investment. Though public
investment may encourage private investment and
increase its productivity, the opposite effect is possi-
ble as well,depending on the kind of investment and
the existing capital stock. In this case the waiving of
public investment, together with less debt and less
future tax burden, may lead to more productive pri-
vate investment. Finally, the analogy to the private
sector concerning return on investment is limited.
While the economic profitability of an investment
project of a private enterprise has to show up at least
in the long run in financial returns,public investment
does not have to.
In the face of all these problems with the golden rule,
there are a number of arguments in favour of a struc-
turally balanced budget in order to guarantee sus-
tainable public finance and to limit net borrowing.
While a golden rule allows net borrowing at the
amount of public investment, according to a struc-
turally balanced budget rule net borrowing is
allowed only for cyclical reasons (automatic stabilis-
ers) and there must be additional saving efforts in
the case of a cyclical upswing. The consequence is a
reduction of public debt in relation to GDP. Even a
budget rule that is less restrictive but still in accor-
dance with the SGP – e.g.the “close to balance”-rule
which prescribes for Germany a minimal structural
deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP – would be much more
advantageous than the current rule.Finally,the qual-
ity of public finance is also guaranteed in a struc-
turally balanced budget rule. It may be even superi-
or to the golden rule, as it does not have a bias
towards “physical” capital formation. This rule
would prescribe the legislator to shift the expendi-
tures to those of “high quality types (education and
R&D)” that are viable for the future, regardless of
whether they are classified as investment or con-
sumption expenditures. Here the new deficit regime
meets or is even part of the “Quality of Public
Finance” agenda, now being developed at the EU
level and its members, including Germany.
2 Empirical studies find no or at best a very weak relationship
between the amounts invested for education and the outcome (see
the zero or even negative correlations between the PISA results
and education expenditure in Sachverständigenrat 2004 and
Hanushek 2002).Criteria and proposal for a new budget rule
Regardless of its design, a budget rule has to fulfil
certain indispensable criteria. First, there should be
an effective limit for (structural) net borrowing.
Second,the rule should lead to stabilisation over the
business cycle and guarantee sustainability of public
finance in the long run. Moreover, the budget rule
must be compatible with the SGP. Additionally, it
must have an enforcement mechanism requiring not
only ex ante control,i.e.with the establishment of the
budget, but also after execution of the budget.
Finally, the viability of the rule has to be guaranteed
by an exception clause in case of emergencies.These
essential criteria must be embedded in a budget rule
that is technically and legally feasible. As a special
problem of Germany’s federalism, federal aspects
also have to be considered.
As shown in the previous section,there are a number
of arguments against a budget rule that relies on the
golden rule concept.This holds especially for the case
of Germany where a necessary new definition of the
investment concept involves serious problems.This is
one of the main differences to the proposal of the
German Council of Economic Experts (CEE) pub-
lished in its Spring 2007 expertise commissioned by
the Federal Minister of Economics and Technology.
Entitled “Limiting Government Debt Effectively”
(Sachverständigenrat 2007) it defends the (net)
investment concept. A prominent supporter of devi-
ating from the golden rule is the Advisory Council to
the Federal Ministry of Finance, which advocated its
position in a letter to the Federal Minister of Finance
in July 2007 (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim
Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2007).Besides rely-
ing on the investment concept, the CEE also intro-
duced in its proposal a component for cyclical adjust-
ment close to the so-called debt brake in Switzerland,
which was proposed in 2000 (Schweizerischer
Bundesrat 2000) and realised in 2002.
In our view, a new budget rule should be compatible
with the “close to balance or in surplus” approach of
the SGP, which also shows some similarities with the
Swiss debt brake. The following principles must be
followed. First and as the main principle, the budget
must be balanced in general in terms of revenues and
expenditures without net borrowing.Second,the new
rule should play a stabilising role for budget policy
over the business cycle. Allowing automatic stabilis-
ers to work assures that the budget rule reacts sym-
metrically over the business cycle. Therefore, in case
of divergences from potential output, cyclical adjust-
ments in net borrowing should be allowed. A cycli-
cally induced increase in net borrowing (or a lower
surplus) should be possible with a negative output
gap, while net borrowing ought to be reduced by
cyclically caused excess revenues or reduced expen-
ditures (or a fiscal surplus has to be realised) in a sit-
uation with a positive output gap.This symmetry over
the business cycle provides additional room for net
borrowing in bad times, which leads to a systematic
increase in public debt in the long run.The symmet-
rical consideration of the business cycle was also
demanded by the Federal Constitutional Court:“it is
necessary to develop mechanisms that guarantee the
necessary balance of the budget over several fiscal
years.The choice and institutionalisation of rules that
counteract conveniently the incentive to postpone
balancing burdens on future legislations is the task of
the legislator,who is able to change the Constitution”
(Bundesverfassungsgericht 2007).
Cyclical adjustment has already been used in the
application of the SGP,which aims at controlling and
evaluating (1) the medium-term objectives (MTO) of
the budget, (2) the adjustment steps leading to the
MTO,and (3) the recommendations of the European
Council to the Member States made for correcting
excessive deficits and the required time span.
While in the concept of the CEE, as in the Swiss
model, the cyclical component is calculated with the
Hodrick-Prescott filter, we propose following the
SGP and applying the production function approach
in order to estimate potential output.This is the ref-
erence method agreed by the European Council on
12 July 2002.3 However, as potential output is an
unobservable variable, there is neither a single cor-
rect estimation approach nor a clear result. The
Hodrick-Prescott-filter method is a purely statistical
one,while the production function approach is based
more strongly on economic theory. In general these
and other computation methods lead to similar
results, although the output gaps may differ even in
sign in certain periods. All methods also have the
problem that values for former periods are usually
revised, which may eventually change even the sign
(+ or –) of the output gap.
Cyclical adjustment is applied as follows. The cyclical
component of the fiscal balance is calculated as the
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product of the budgetary sensitivity and the output
gap. Budgetary sensitivities, i.e. the elasticities of the
budget deficit on a change in the output gap, have
been derived for the European Commission by the
OECD in a sophisticated approach (André and
Girouard 2005). Cyclical components of the budget
according to the SGP are tax revenues, social security
contributions and labour market expenditures. The
result for Germany has been evaluated also in a sepa-
rate work by the Ifo Institute (Büttner et al. 2005),
which confirmed a general government budgetary sen-
sitivity for Germany of 0.5 as obtained by the OECD.
This empirical analysis also showed that about 50 per-
cent of the cyclical component can be attributed to the
federal budget and the rest to the budgets of the social
security system, the states and municipalities.
Subtracting the cyclical component from the fiscal bal-
ance leads to the cyclically adjusted fiscal balance,
which means, for example, that an output gap of
– 1 percent generally results in a cyclical component of
the budget deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP.
Third, the medium-term objective of the SGP has to
be observed.Therefore,net borrowing must be limit-
ed to the medium-term objective of the SGP (“close
to balance or in surplus”) which tolerates a maxi-
mum structural deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP for the
general government.In addition,in order to be com-
patible with the Maastricht definition, this amount
should be corrected for net financial transactions
(mainly privatisation gains).This aims at guarantee-
ing durably sustainable public budgets and therefore
full compliance with the Code of Conduct of the
revised SGP, which states: “Member States should
achieve a more symmetrical approach to fiscal poli-
cy over the cycle through enhanced budgetary disci-
pline in periods of economic recovery, with the
objective to avoid pro-cyclical policies and to gradu-
ally reach their medium-term objective,thus creating
the necessary room to accommodate economic
downturns and reduce government debt at a satis-
factory pace, thereby contributing to the long-term
sustainability of public finance. The presumption is
to use unexpected extra revenues for deficit and
debt reduction”.4
Since the Federation takes nearly 70 percent of the
total public debt, we propose an interjurisdictional
distribution of a net borrowing share of 70 and
30 percent between the Federation and the states.
This would mean 0.35 percent of GDP for the
Federation,i.e.a tolerated Maastricht deficit of about
€  81⁄2 bn at present. Subsequently the allowed net
borrowing ceiling (or the required minimum fiscal
surplus) amounts to the cyclical component of the
budget subtracted by the sum of 0.35 percent of GDP
and net financial transactions.
Because in the long run public debt as a share of
GDP is expected to be reduced to far below 60 per-
cent, our approach – as well as that of the CEE –
takes intergenerational justice and future viability
into consideration. Debt reduction can be used to
cover implicit liabilities, which, in turn, makes an
important contribution to long-term sustainability of
public finance. A decreasing public debt ratio also
opens room for manoeuvre so that expenditures can
be shifted towards tasks relevant to the future. This
improves the quality of public finance.An exception
clause to the general rule should be formulated only
for specific emergency cases. In order to overcome
an extreme crisis, e.g. a natural disaster coupled with
a severe economic downturn, a two-thirds majority
or an even higher quorum of the Bundestag may pro-
vide extra scope for net borrowing.
In terms of enforcement, there is a need for moni-
toring and setting incentives not only for the estab-
lishment but also for the execution of the budget.
Deviations from the allowed expenditure ceiling
(or the minimum fiscal surplus) defined by this
budget rule will be put on a special account, the so-
called control fund, which acts as “memory and
buffer” if non-compliance with the rule is estab-
lished ex post.
Deviations of the actual from the minimum fiscal
balance are accumulated over the years in the con-
trol fund. However, the minimum fiscal balance may
change over the course of the fiscal year compared
to that forecasted at the time of the budget approval
due to different unforeseen economic, i.e. cyclical
developments. This will be taken into account in a
pragmatic approach by correcting the cyclical com-
ponent by the deviation of the actual growth rate of
GDP from the forecasted one.A similar approach is
chosen in the assessment of the excessive deficit pro-
cedure for Germany.This would mean, for example,
that with a forecasted real GDP growth of 2 percent,
but a realisation of only 1 percent, the one percent-
age difference between these two rates would be
multiplied by the budgetary sensitivity and the share
4 See European Commission (2006), Specifications on the
Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and Guidelines
on the Format and Content of Stability and Convergence
Programmes, 2006, ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/about/activi-
ties/sgp/codeofconduct_en.pdf.of the Federation.The same is true for the opposite
case if the forecasted GDP growth is more pes-
simistic than the realisation. This so-called ex post
additional cyclical component will then be added to
the ex ante cyclical component and either reduces or
increases the minimum fiscal balance that is not rel-
evant for the control fund. The target-performance
comparison will be made as soon as there are pre-
liminary results for the budget and GDP growth of
the fiscal year.
Nonetheless,in cases when the debit side is in excess
of a defined threshold level possible policy measures
have to be introduced as soon as an excess is
observed. Consolidation measures have to be imple-
mented in a way that the debit side falls below the
threshold level again within a specified time scope.
The threshold amount could be set at above 1 per-
cent of GDP, for example.A backward simulation of
this rule to the years 2000 until 2007 shows that this
level would never have been exceeded on the debit
side. This simulation was done under the assump-
tions that the allowed net borrowing is bailed out ex
ante, i.e. at the time of budget approval. Deviations
between targeted and actual net borrowing equal the
actual deviations in the past (taking net financial
transactions into account).
As pointed out above, the opportunity to introduce
a new budget rule should be exploited now.And as
the general government budget will be balanced in
2011 according to the current budget plan, it seems
unnecessary to consider an adjustment path until
the new budget rule can work.The new rule would
become effective when the budget is balanced. As
the SGP demands budget discipline for the general
government and the Federation takes the responsi-
bility vis-à-vis the EU, it might be politically desir-
able to have a budget rule that covers not only the
central governmental level but also the state level.
(In principle all municipalities should have a bal-
anced budget.) Basically there is no technical prob-
lem to translate the budget rule to all levels of gov-
ernment,though there is no need for fiscal policy to
do so. As tax revenues among the states are
equalised to a large extent by the fiscal equalisation
scheme between the federal government and the
states, there is no close relation between regional
GDP and regional tax revenue.The cyclical compo-
nent therefore could be divided according to the
distribution of tax revenues after fiscal equalisa-
tion, which corresponds to the split made based on
the share of the population.
But a translation of the proposed budget rule to the
states could cause some problems, since the starting
conditions and, consequently, the time path to a
structurally balanced budget differ from one state to
another.While some of them have a balanced budget
or are even in surplus, others have a distressed bud-
get: the eastern German states, for example, addi-
tionally receive special equalisation payments from
the federal government. The main task of the states
is merely to introduce a preventive measure in order
to avoid financial distress of the individual states,
which was also demanded by the Federal Court of
Justice.This could be, for example, an early warning
system. In this context a stability council sets a time
path for those states lacking a balanced budget, for-
mulates a concept of financial restructuring for a
state in distress, controls the state’s adherence to it,
and decides on possible sanctions if the consolida-
tion program fails.
Conclusion
A reform of the existing budget rule is inevitable in
Germany. Economic and fiscal conditions as well as
the political environment of a grand coalition are
favourable for a reform and such an opportunity
should be fully exploited.The reform of a budget rule
is one of the main topics of the Committee on the
Modernisation of the Financial Relations between the
Federation and the states at present – a task addition-
ally triggered by the Federal Constitutional Court.
Although the need for a new budget rule appears to
be clear, the question, however, about its format
remains. The link of the budgetary process to the
business cycle is not new.What is new is the applica-
tion of econometric methods in budget policy mak-
ing. Another innovation would be the introduction
of a link between the establishment and the execu-
tion of the budget in the form of the control fund.
The Swiss experience shows that this is technically
and politically feasible.
Beyond the necessary political commitment, there
are, of course, some questions about the technical
realisation to be solved if the budget rule is reformed
in the sense outlined above. A particular concern is
about the design of the control fund and how it should
work.The formulation for the Constitution also poses
a challenge. But we think that all these are manage-
able. The gain of a credible commitment to sustain-
able public finance should by far outweigh its costs.
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Last but not least, all this has to be realised in a
manageable way for the daily work of preparing,
executing and controlling the budget. Parlia-
mentarians of all parties now seem to accept that
Germany needs a new stricter deficit rule which will
also diminish or self-restrict ministers’ and minister
presidents’ power to spend on the federal and the
state level, respectively. Moreover, it is a paradigm
change,more “economic”than the old rule to which
everybody is accustomed. So it will take time to
overcome the existing scepticism related to imple-
menting a new system. Nevertheless, we are con-
vinced that this new model will gain political and
public acceptance due to its positive impact on pub-
lic finance, and, consequently on growth and sus-
tainability of German economy.
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